Navigation: Jump to content areas:


Pro Quality. Fan Perspective.
Login-facebook
Around SBN: Auto Racer Jeffrey Earnhardt Excited to Make MMA Debut

Are big free agent contracts worth it?

Editors note: Promoted from fanposts.

There have been lots of Blue Jays rumours so far this off season and they have spurred tons of discussion. Though purported Jays' targets like Yu Darvish, Carlos Beltran, and Gio Gonzalez have gone to other teams, one player who has consistently been thought to be a good fit for the Jays is Prince Fielder. Many objections to his potential signing focus on the large contract he is likely to command and whether this outlay represents good value for the signing team.

Some BBBers have questioned the utility of signing any free agents to large long term contracts given the likelihood that aging will catch up to the player well before the end of his contract. Certainly the extension JP Ricciardi handed to Vernon Wells has left a bitter taste in Jays fans' mouths and made some recoil from offering similar money to any big name free agent. But the question remains: is it ever a good idea to hand out 9-figure guarantees to a free agent? Do these contracts ever actually provide good value or do they all become albatrosses to their teams and cripple their finances?

The answer is after the jump...

Star-divide

To date, there have been 11 contracts of over $100 million handed out to free agent position players. Two were signed in the 2010/2011 offseason (Jayson Werth and Carl Crawford) and one in the 2011/2012 offseason (Albert Pujols). Given that these players have played one or zero years under their big deals, I did not include them in the primary analysis. However, I will provide projections for Werth and Crawford's worth at the end.

Also, this analysis looks only at free agent contracts, not extensions. Extensions are generally given out when players are still in or slightly before the player's peak years and, I think, fall into a separate category than free agent signing since the players tend to be earlier in their careers when signing big-money extension. I also didn't include pitchers to limit the size of the analysis and since it seems to me like an apples-to-oranges comparison, though whether they should have been included could be debated.

A final note before getting to the meat - this article is not meant to answer the question of whether Fielder is likely to be worth his free agent contract or if the Jays should sign him. Reasonable people can disagree over Fielder's projected WAR output, his likely career arc given his age and body type, and other factors that play into the Jays' decision to acquire him or not. I am merely trying to see if large outlays on free agent position players have represented sound investments for teams in the past.

The 8 players included in this analysis are Alex Rodriguez, Manny Ramirez, Jason Giambi, Carlos Beltran, Carlos Lee, Alfonso Soriano, Mark Teixeira, and Matt Holliday.

Let's look at these contracts one-by-one. The year cited is the first year the player played under his $100M+ free agent contract:

1) Alex Rodriguez, Yankees, 2001 (age 26 season). 10 years, $252M.

Rodriguez's contract had an opt-out clause which he exercised after the 2007 season. To that point, he had put up seasons of 10, 9.3, 6.8, 9.1, 4.3, 9.8, 9.8 fWAR, good for 59.1 fWAR in total on a salary of $161M. This represented a value of $2.72M/WAR, an outstanding value. Rodriguez then signed a new, more lucrative deal after 2007 and followed it with seasons of 6.3, 4.3, and 3.8 fWAR. Had ARod played as well under his original contract, he would have finished with 73.5WAR, costing the Yankees $3.42M/WAR over the life of the contract. Despite ARod's mammoth contract, he actually provided exceptional value for the money.

2) Manny Ramirez, Red Sox, 2001 (age 29). 8 years, $160M.

Ramirez played 7.5 seasons for the Sox under this deal and was then traded to the Dodgers. He accrued 5.2, 5.4, 6.2, 3.7, 3.2, 3.0, 1.5, 6.0 = 34.2WAR over that time, representing an average cost of $4.7M/WAR. Without the exact $/WAR values over this time period, this probably represents fair value, or possibly slightly above the average market rate.

3) Jason Giambi, Yankees, 2002 (age 31). 7 years, $120M

Coming into this analysis, I thought Giambi's the first true albatross in the bunch. However, his 7 years were worth 7.0, 5.0, 0.1, 4.3, 2.9, 0.5, 2.1 fWAR, good for 21.9 total. The $120M value breaks down to $5.5M/WAR. Not bad by today's standards, but given the lower market value of WAR in the early 2000's, that was a lot to pay at the time. Nevertheless, I would categorize this deal as bad, but not horrible or crippling by any means.

4) Carlos Beltran, Mets, 2005 (age 28). 7 years, $119M

Looking at his numbers, I didn't remember just how great Beltran was, especially at the peak of his career. After signing this deal, Beltran went 2.7, 7.9, 5.5, 7.6, 3.0, 0.8, 4.7 for 32.2WAR over the course of the contract. This gave the Mets $3.7M/WAR, very good value indeed.

5) Carlos Lee, Astros, 2007 (age 31). 6 years, $100M

Lee's contract is the first in our analysis that has not yet been completed. Over the first 5 years, Lee has not lived up to his deal. He has had seasons worth 3.4, 3.6, 1.2, -1, 3.2, or 10.4 total fWAR. Given his $81.5M total salary thus far, he has cost the Astros $7.8M/WAR, not good value at all. Given that he has one more year on his contract, I projected his 2012 season fWAR. For this and all other projections in this analysis, I used the player's fWAR from 2011, 2010, and 2009 using a 5-3-2 weighting to project his likely 2012 fWAR. Feel free to quibble with these projections, but I feel that it is a reasonable way to go about it.

Under this projection scheme, Lee figures to put up 1.5 fWAR in 2012, bringing his total production to 11.9 WAR for the $100M, or $8.4M/WAR. Unless Lee somehow puts up a career year, this contract will go down as a very bad one for the Astros. And even if Lee does bounce back with a great year, that will likely only bring the contract's status up to somewhere between "not terrible" and "meh."

6) Alfonso Soriano, Cubs, 2007 (age 31). 8 years, $136M.

Soriano has played 5 of the 8 seasons the Cubs guaranteed him. The first was great, worth 7.0 fWAR. After that, however, he has gone 4.1, 0, 3.1, 1.3 for 15.5 total fWAR to date. He has earned $82M in that time, providing a value of $5.3M/WAR, or a fairly decent return on investment. However, his projected 2012 output is a mere 1.6 fWAR. Using a -0.5WAR/year aging curve to project ever further in the future, Soriano figures to put up 3.3 more fWAR before his contract is up. This would total 18.8 fWAR for the $136M, or $7.2M/WAR. Though his value has not been awful to date, Soriano is unlikely to play well enough going forward to make his contract worthwhile over all. Chalk this one up into the bad contract column

7) Mark Teixeira, Yankees, 2009 (Age 29). 8 Years, $160M.

In three seasons, Tex has given the Yankees 5.2, 3.2, and 4.2 fWAR seasons, for 12.6 in total. He has earned $62.5M in salary, or $5M/WAR. This basically market value over that time, representing a pretty fair deal. I project him at 4.1 fWAR next year, followed bu 3.6, 3.1, 2.6, and 2.1 over the rest of the contract. This works out to 28.1 fWAR total, yielding $6.4M/WAR over the life of the deal. From 2009 through 2016, $6.4M/WAR is probably only very slightly above the average market cost in that time period. Therefore, I would categorize this contract as being a fair deal.

8) Matt Holliday, Cardinals, 2010 (Age 30). 7 years, $120M

Holliday has played only 2 seasons of his big time deal, but he has played very well in that time, accumulating 11.7 fWAR in 2 seasons. He earned $34M in that time, so has provided $2.9M/WAR of value, quite the bargain. However, he is entering his age 32 season, so probably won't be a 6WAR player for the rest of his contract. Using my weighting system, Holliday projects for 5.6, 5.1, 4.6, 4.1, 3.6 in the next three seasons, or 23 fWAR. This would provide 34.7 fWAR over the life of his deal, good for $3.5M/WAR. Given that the current $/WAR estimate is $5M and inreasing, this contract represents exceptional value and Holliday seems quite likely to continue to provide great value going forward.

EXTRA: Both Carl Crawford and Jayson Werth signed $100M+ contract last offseason. Neither had a particularly auspicious starts, with Crawford going for 0.2WAR and Werth 2.5. However, I think it's too early to count both these guys out entirely. Based on my projections, Crawford should be worth 3.6WAR next year. With -0.5WAR per year for aging/decline, Crawford projects to give 14.3 fWAR, or $9.9M/WAR. Unless he bounces back in a big way (which is not out of the question, if you ask me), Crawford's deal is looking pretty bad. Werth projects next year at 3.8WAR and 17.8 fWAR total over the 7 year life of his deal. Based on this projection, he will be worth $7.1M/WAR, probably a bit above market rate, but certainly not a ridiculously bad deal.

So what have we learned here? First, large contracts to free agent position players can work out well for the team. Rodriguez's enormous deal actually provided excellent value for the Yankees, though it's questionable whether any other team could have afforded such a large outlay even with the outstanding value it represented. Beltran also provided great value, and Holliday is well on his way to similar status. Also, perhaps predictably, the older the player is when signed to his deal, the less likely he is to provide good value. Given that Fielder is entering his age 28 season, this may support the idea that giving him a large contract won't become a huge burden for the signing team, although whether he will follow a "typical" ageing curve is a topic of hot debate.

Of the 8 offers qualifying for this analysis, I would categorize only 2 as "crippling" - Lee's and Soriano's. The rest fell into the range between "fair" (Ramirez and, probably, Teixeira) and "not good but not horrible" value (Giambi). Certainly giving large contracts to players at or nearing their decline phase is a risk, and occasionally can be exceedingly terrible deals. But given to the right player, long term free agent contracts can provide fair and even better-than-market value to the team willing to shell out the cash. This does not purport to predict which category Prince Fielder will fall into, but certainly it demonstrates that large free agent outlays are not uniformly terrible ideas. Indeed, it seems they can be great values, fair values, and poor values almost equally often.

Comment 70 comments  |  7 recs  | 

Do you like this story?

Comments

Display:

First and foremost

Excellent analysis, and nice to have everything comprehensively. I had been looking at doing something like this, but it wasn’t real high on my list of priorities given the prevailing wisdom.

I have a few points/constructive criticisms to make, which will require greater detail and time I don’t have right now. So I’m just going to make one suggestion – I think you’re relying too much on looking at the $/WAR using the current going rates, rather than the ones that prevailled over the course of the deals – this is made more difficult by fact that baseball inflation has been pretty high, and at 7%, salaries (and thus value) doubles in 10 years ago. So whereas $5/WAR is the going rate today, $2.5M/WAR was closer to the going rate 10 years ago. So whereas you have $3.7M/WAR for Beltran as very good value, I’d guess it’s closer to a push or slightly positive. And similarly, with A-Rod’s deal (over the full 10 years, I think this is the proper analysis since he only would opt out if it’s good for him), the $3.4M/WAR is probably slightly above fair value, rather than exceptional value

Regardless, this is a great post to hopefully jump start some solid discussion based on facts.

by MjwW on Dec 29, 2011 11:34 PM EST reply actions  

you are right

and I knew this was a limitation to my analysis from the beginning. If I had wanted to spend more time on the analysis, I could have gone into more detail. As is, this took quite a long time to compile. I figured we could hash out the details in the comments if I just provided the framework in the main post.

However, I think you may be overstating how good these deals are. Even just looking at the average $/WAR figures over the past years, many of these deals still turned out great, even if not quite as good as if they had been signed in 2011. If we assume the value for 1 WAR was $2.5M in 2001 and $5M in 2010, that puts the average value of a win over that decade at around $3.75M/WAR. ARod came in at $3.42M/WAR over 10 years, which is quite good value if you ask me.

Beltran’s deal started in 2005, when the value of a win was probably in the $3.5M/WAR range (I don’t have the actual numbers on hand). Over his 7 year contract, 1 WAR averages out to around $4.2M/WAR or so. That $3.7M/WAR value still looks mighty good. And Holliday seems right on track to provide good value for the Cardinals’ money as well.

An additional complication is that because acquiring players capable of putting up high WAR totals (i.e. MVP caliber players) is much more difficult than lower-WAR players (i.e. capable starters), teams should (and do) place a premium on the extra WAR per season that such players can provide. That is, the 6th WAR a player can put up in a season is more valuable than the 2nd. I am not aware of calculations that have demonstrate just how large this premium is, but I think its fair to say that such a premium does exist.

So while it’s relatively easy to find a 1-2WAR guy on the scrap heap and exploit him for a huge $/WAR value, its much harder to do that for an MVP type free agent since you have to pay extra for his MVP-level WAR production. So I think any time a free agent’s large contract comes in well under the average $/WAR value of his era, that should be considered a rousing success for the signing team. Even deals like Ramirez’s which basically provided fair value for the Red Sox should be seen in a very positive light, since the Sox had to pay extra to get his premium-WAR bat.

Given that I think the Jays are close to a contention window, if they think they can sign Fielder and have him equal the average $/WAR value over the life of that contract, they should go for it. Given the history of large FA deals and my personal assessment of his skills, I think he is a pretty good bet to at least provide fair value over that contract. Feel free to disagree with that, but I think history has shown that large free agent deals aren’t the uniform team-killers that some make them out to be. Indeed, they seem far more likely to provide fair-to-good value than become true albatrosses.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 9:15 AM EST up reply actions  

oops!

second paragraph: “I think you may be overstating how good these contracts are” should read “…UNDERSTATING how good these contracts are…”

And, now that I think of it, I may have slightly overstated the average $/WAR values over the lives of ARod and Beltran’s contracts. ARod’s average value was probably closer to $3.5M/WAR than $3.75M, while Beltran’s was more like $4M than $4.2. Neverthless, both deals still come in under the average dollar values over the life of the contract.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 9:20 AM EST up reply actions  

I'm not sure that premium for high WAR player exists

You would think it exists for the very reason you mention (it’s easier to find a 2 WAR player than a 4 WAR player which is in turn easier to find a 6 WAR player), but the linear $/WAR model seems to be working (http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/linear-dollars-per-win-again/). The premium should cause an a curve in the $/WAR but it’s not, and I think that accounting of injuries is preventing the premium from showing up (check out Kenny William’s quote in this fangraphs article: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/albert-pujols-and-linear-dollars-per-win/).

by siggian on Dec 30, 2011 10:01 AM EST up reply actions  

hmm, interesting

that’s what I get for trusting my intuition over cold, impersonal numbers.

Perhaps rather than a true $ premium for high-WAR players, we should adjust our perception of what is a good deal. On the trade market and in evaluating contracts for pre-FA players, the operative variable seems to be surplus value. It’s also great to find scrap-heap FAs who are signed for cheap, but give good surplus value over what they signed for.

However, as discussed above, it’s much much easier to find a cheap guy who will give you 1-2 WAR than a cheap guy who will give you 4-5 WAR. In the market for high-WAR free agents, it’s no secret that these players are excellent and everyone knows that they are capable of MVP-caliber seasons. So rather than actually having to pay a premium in dollars for the extra WAR (which seems to not actually exist), I think we should readjust our expectations for what constitutes a good signing. In the market for this type of player (i.e. high-WAR FAs), I think any contract that yields a $/WAR value of around market value (i.e. ARod, Manny, Beltran, Teixeira, Holliday in this analysis, and arguably even Giambi) should be considered a good signing by the team. This contrasts to the FA market for low-WAR players and the trade and pre-FA markets where a signing should produce a fair amount of surplus value in order to be considered “good.”

Yes, this is partially an argument over semantics, but semantics can be important, too.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 1:03 PM EST up reply actions  

Wonderful Post

Thanks so much for putting this together
I’m just curious, why didn’t you include A-Rod’s new 10 year $275,000,000 contract?
I know that you included the seasons that would have been covered by his original contract in your analysis, but, at the same time, he’s played 4 years of his current contract thus far.

I am the Walrus

by yleviticus on Dec 30, 2011 9:24 AM EST reply actions  

The Answer is an emphatic hell no.

A-Rod’s bWAR since signing is 5.4, 3.6, 3.2, and 2.7 with a salary of 28, 33, 33, 32 mil/yr.

Boras sold the Centaur at his absolute peak. His 2007 bWAR was 9.9.

In honor of the Jays 2nd Baseman who played with fire in more ways than one.

by Damaso's Burnt Shirt on Dec 30, 2011 10:32 AM EST up reply actions  

Great post

I’d love to see another one in about 6 years discussing the Werth signing and other such large contracts (we are seeing more 100M+ contracts nowadays, mainly due to inflation)

25% of large contracts are crippling, seems fair. Too bad its too early to include Wells, Werth, and Crawford.

by Mike Andrew on Dec 30, 2011 11:52 AM EST reply actions  

to answer for SuckaMD

Wells is different because he was an extension and not a free agent, and he actually does cover Werth and Crawford briefly

by benk on Dec 30, 2011 12:05 PM EST up reply actions  

I explained in the article why I didn't include extensions

mostly for length purposes, but also because extensions tend to be signed at earlier stages in a player’s career arc, so it seemed like an apples-to-oranges comparison to me.

It’s also possible (at least intuitively, to me) that given that extensions are usually given earlier in a player’s career, teams may be willing to give certain players (Wells, for one) large extensions while they are still nominally in their peak years whereas that same player may not have commanded a $100M+ salary had they played out their arb years and signed a FA contract since they would be several years older at the time.

For these reasons, I felt that we should only look at players that fit Fielder’s profile – i.e. free agent position players. If you want to add onto the analysis by looking at extensions, or including pitchers, feel free to do so. I, however, did not feel it appropriate to do so.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 1:09 PM EST up reply actions  

I would add

Beyond these very good reasons, there’s another reason not to include extensions. Even though they are usually buying out mostly free agent years, the player is not a free agent, so he’s only negotiating with one team. Now, of course, he has a good deal of leverage, since he will soon be a free agent (as in the Wells case), but it is not completely analogous, since he is not actually testing the open market.

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 1:35 PM EST up reply actions  

I understand the extension exclusion

I’m not so sure that a contract extension that is this large is significantly different from a free-agent signing. Would extensions this large usually only buy out a single year of control?

by siggian on Dec 30, 2011 12:10 PM EST up reply actions  

Sample Size

To say that 2 out of 8 contracts being failures = 25% of large contracts are crippling isn’t fair, for the same reason that we all accused John Farrell of being a moron by playing splits based on small sample sizes towards the beginning of the year.

Categorical statistical data on this sort of thing simply isn’t possible yet.

by TimZig on Dec 31, 2011 2:30 PM EST up reply actions  

Only 8 contracts fit the critera

Only in your world are there more than 8 people willing to go above 100M.

Its not a small sample size if it covers every single 100M+ contract in FA.

by Mike Andrew on Dec 31, 2011 4:04 PM EST up reply actions  

it is a small sample, admittedly

it is possible that a large enough sample does not exist to perform an adequate study into a given phenomenon, as is the case here. We definitely can’t conclude that the “failure rate” on $100M+ FA contracts is 25% based on available data, though I agree that somewhere between 1/3 of $100M+ FA contracts ending up being categorized as “crippling” seems reasonable to me on an intuitive basis.

We still can glean some meaningful information from this 8 contract sample. Given that there are more successes/fair-deals than failures in the above sample, I think we can conclude that large FA contracts to position players are not uniformly a bad idea and can actually provide reasonable to good value in a good number of instances.

by SuckaMD on Jan 1, 2012 11:24 AM EST up reply actions  

Something that is missing

Is the size of the contract to the size of the budget of the signing team.

I say this because even though the A-Roid contract did provide value for money, it was so large that the team that originally signed him to it, Texas, found it to be crippling. So much so that they actually paid NYY to take the contract off their books.

It’s one thing for a team like the Yankees to take a 9 figure gamble. It’s a whole lot scarier for a mid-payroll team to gamble a larger percentage of their budget for a long time, even if there is a reasonable chance of gaining value.

by siggian on Dec 30, 2011 12:06 PM EST reply actions  

marginal value of wins and percentage of payroll may change

but market value does not, and that’s the only fair way to assess deals

by benk on Dec 30, 2011 12:07 PM EST up reply actions  

but

it would be an interesting thing to look at

by benk on Dec 30, 2011 12:07 PM EST up reply actions  

This keeps going back and forth, but I disagree that market value doesn’t change. Have seven identical pitchers on the market and they will receive different deals. Have only a few mediocre pitchers on the market, and their value goes way up as the market changes. If you’re a team that absolutely has to add pitching, you’re going to likely overpay for that mediocre pitcher.

I just don’t see how the argument can be made that market value is stable when the market demand and valuation is entirely individual and mutable.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 2:06 PM EST up reply actions  

Well, in strict terms you’re right. But the point is, in aggregate the market roughly works itself out to a point where there is a an equilibrium around a certain value.

Put another way – the point of building a baseball team is to score more runs, and allow less, and that’s what teams pay baseball players to do. If there’s only mediocre pitching, they may slightly overpay relative to others years, but quite quickly it will make more sense to upgrade elsewhere than chase the mediocre pitcher whose services are highly in demand

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 2:19 PM EST up reply actions  

But it’s so circumstantial that I think beyond a very general model, attempting to normalize value is largely ineffective. If you’re a team that needs that mediocre number four starter in the rotation to move you from an 88 win plateau to 90-91 wins, you’re going value those three wins a lot greater than if you’re at a 70 win plateau.

I don’t disagree with the rough measure of, what is it, $5M/WAR. It’s not a bad way of assessing a team and seeing if they’re in the ballpark of their value. But when judging individual contracts, I think you have to take in all the factors involved to determine the relative worth.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 2:24 PM EST up reply actions  

yes, you are going to value those extra wins more

but you still won’t need to pay more to get them. You only need to outbid the next highest guy for that player’s services. You might be willing to blow their offer out of the water to ensure you can get your guy, but you don’t need to.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 2:27 PM EST up reply actions  

Isn’t that the whole point of a market? If I need those wins and so does another couple of teams, that’s going to inflate the number needed to land that player. Unless the teams are colluding, they will keep going up until it gets past the point of one of them being willing to pay. So if I’ve decided that those extra wins has a greater value to me, I’m going to factor that in how I value the acquisition of the player who will provide them. Which changes his market value from the ‘normalized’ assessment to the revised contextual value.

I used to collect comics, and a few years ago, I did a bit of a cull, priced them out of the Overstreet Guide which evaluates comics at their market value. And with that number, I wandered down to a few stores to get some quotes. The amount offered was substantially less than what the Overstreet Guide suggested. Because one store already had copies of many of mine. Another really didn’t move that many older issues so didn’t often buy them. Finally, I sold them online and got at least closer to the value, but still no where near. Last year, I sold a VG Giant Sized X-Men for three times the book value because there wasthe X-Men movie release and interest was high. So, the broad value of my collection is my book or insurance value. But the market value is something very different and always changing.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 2:45 PM EST up reply actions  

I'd theoretically agree

But two reasons why I disagree in practice:
1) I’m firmly an 80/20 guy. My feeling is, this approach gives you 80% of the analytical value, with 20% of the work and time of trying to bring in a ton more individual factors. Now, maybe that’s lazy, but the way I see it, we’re estimating anyway (if we were in a front office and had much more detailed tools, sure, I’d want to be much more detailed), so this is fine.
2) There’s something to be said for standardizing the approach. If you start bringing thing in for different players, you can start cherry picking and getting garbage-in-garbage-out results. Maybe you figure team X’s marginal revenue is more like $6M/WAR than $5M because of where they are on the win curve, and that justifies the contract. But there’s really no way to know this for sure.

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 2:43 PM EST up reply actions  

Okay, my counterpoint is that this is baseball video game methods of assessing value of contracts. If Vernon Wells is an 86 player, I can easily swap him for two 78 players because together their point values match his to the game’s trading programming.

As I said, a normalized idea of value is only a very rough guideline. It’s not a bad way to look at which teams are and are not likely spending their money wisely against their return. But when you’re dropping other factors in order to establish that baseline of value, I see it becoming less useful as a real method to understand the value of individual contracts.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 2:49 PM EST up reply actions  

It really comes down to one's approach

I just think there’s too much noise to do what you’re saying, and seperate out the signal – basically, even if a team were in a sport (say 88 wins) where the value of a win is higher than average, you can’t assume that for each year of the 7 or 8 year deal you’ll still be there. There’s a good chance you end up back around the average.

I understand what you’re saying, and have my reasons for preferring one method over the other, and vice versa for you. Neither of us is right or wrong, persay, since either way has problems that really we lack the tools to solve.

On a sidenote – over enough contracts, using what you refer to as the normalized approach, we should be able to observe the average difference in how team value a Win relative to the market aggregate – the difference between the $/WAR value that would be needed to set surplus value to zero and the observed aggregate market $/WAR.

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 3:04 PM EST up reply actions  

Neither of us is right or wrong, persay, since either way has problems that really we lack the tools to solve.

Actually, I think it’s because any significantly complex environment that lacks an objective measure of value can’t be analyzed by a simple statistical model and then applied universally. You have to look at each market as a seperate segment and analyze the entire market against the percieved value to really create a full understanding of how each FA was valued and what the resulting contract was. Then you need to decide how that value is measured in relation to the performance. A team that overspends, say, $20M on a player past what their resulting performance by WAR values them at, but was part of multiple playoff seasons that they were direct contributors is going to be hard to sell as a bad contract, because the ultimate value of that player is not fully encompassed by their individual WAR.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 5:02 PM EST up reply actions  

Again, from a theoretical perspective, I agree

But let’s try to imagine what that would look like, by building from first principles.

A player’s contract should be determined by his Marginal Revenue Product (MRP). The major revenue streams to individual clubs (not shared) are ticket sales (including concessions and parking), merchandise at the stadium, and TV rights. I don’t think I’m missing anything major. So, we’d have to evaluate the marginal effect of the player on each of these revenue streams. To do this properly, I’d think you need the following:
1) A model to estimate the player performance and how it will improve team performance. This can be done reasonably well from the outside.
2) A model to estimate the effect of winning on ticket sales and revenue, at various levels (different levels of winning, or at least the relevant ranges)
3) A model to estimate the effect of winning on TV viewership and revenue, at various levels
4) A model to estimate of player-related merchandise sales
5) A model to understand the contribution to long-term brand value (this is tricky, but the way I think about it thatif you didn’t invest in your brand by having premium players, winning teams, etc your brand value falls and that hurts your long-term revenue generating capacity)
6) A projection of where you will be on the win curve for each year of the deal, since this feeds into the marginal revenue – we know it’s not linear. For this, I would say teams have a good idea of where will will be one year out, but every further year out becomes less noise and more signal, such that (for instance) 5 years out I don’t see how you could estimate much different than the going market rate with inflation
7) Marginal playoff revebnues generated by havign the player in your teams (that is, the added likelihood of making the playoffs and advancing further). This would be very, very dynamic and difficult to estimate ahead of time
8) Future revenue increases – you have to estimate this anyway.

So basically, we don’t have a good idea of items 2-7, from the outside, using info available publicly. We know wining adds ticket sales, but we don;t know how much, especially team specific. We’d have to adapt more general models, which add more noise.

Or, you have the alternative approach – estimate the added production, and what the market is paying for an added win as a proxy for the MRP. It’s certainly not perfect, we know the MRP isn’t linear (this would be the biggest deficiency IMO). But adding more stuff into the model is only good if is demonstrably adds to the result of the model, and estimating things like where the team is, where other teams are, etc is only going to add to the noise. This is where I come back to the 80/20 thing. And this is where I come from when I say neither of us is right or wrong, we look through different lenses. I’m happy with this is a good, relatively simple yet effective place to start, you want to incorporate more info to rely on the findings (which ideally I’d love, but we just don’t have it). It’s a preference in the end

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 6:36 PM EST up reply actions  

One last thought

This framework, for me, gives a really good place to start to think about a deal, but it’s not the ending point. When you look in aggregate, as SuckaMD did, you get an idea of how they perform relative to the going market rate, and I see this as useful infomation. Obviously, it doesn’t tell us conclusively about whether or not a deal makes sense, but it gives us more information to think about that deal – that’s the utility I see.

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 6:39 PM EST up reply actions  

A player’s contract should be determined by his Marginal Revenue Product (MRP). The major revenue streams to individual clubs (not shared) are ticket sales (including concessions and parking), merchandise at the stadium, and TV rights. I don’t think I’m missing anything major. So, we’d have to evaluate the marginal effect of the player on each of these revenue streams. To do this properly, I’d think you need the following:
1) A model to estimate the player performance and how it will improve team performance. This can be done reasonably well from the outside.
2) A model to estimate the effect of winning on ticket sales and revenue, at various levels (different levels of winning, or at least the relevant ranges)

I think you misunderstand my point and creating a strict ROI confuses the two motives of a front office – what is the desired performance level and how do we reach it versus what is the ideal business model based on cost effectiveness and how do we reach it. Which involves way too many factors that we are not privy too.

But I think your approach, which is to estimate the added production, determine the market rate by win, and then use that as a baseline is still too simplistic. It has huge assumptions that the factors that drive market value (supply and demand) are not present in the equation. I don’t think it’s a realistic representation of the realities of the market, and thus, I think it’s value is limited and abstract in that method.

It’s a method that may suggest digging deeper into the specifics of a contract or a pattern of contracts is warrented. Making any other conclusions from the overly simplified and highly assumptive results is just building on incomplete methodology.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 10:14 PM EST up reply actions  

I'll be honest

At this point, I don’t have a clue about what you are proposing to measure and evaluate big free agent contracts. Maybe I’m just particularly dense right now, but I’m not getting it.

I mean, I understand your criticism of the method I’ve used – the method pioneered by Tango et al, far smarter/more advanced in thinking about this than I am. And I understand that you think individual supply/demand factors should be used, I just don’t understand what framework you’d use to analyze such a contract. So maybe you can flesh this out in a more tangible way, if you were so inclined.

The other thing is, you posit that supply and demand determine market value, and that this might deviate substantially from the average market $/WAR. But I think you’re ignoring a very powerful substitution effect that helps maintain the equilibrium of the $/WAR. If the cost of a specific player is driven too high, teams will look elsewhere to buy wins. They may choose two lesser upgrades instead of one big one in the free agent market, or any number of other moves. This will reduce demand, and push the cost back down. While of course premium players are somewhat unique, at the end of the day, from a baseball perspective, their utility is in producing or preventing runs, and there’s enough other options that rational teams do not overpar for the production (of course, then there’s factors like going for it and what not, but then we’re back to MRP considerations).

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 10:44 PM EST up reply actions   1 recs

Okay, short answers.

First, I don’t think you can make a purely statistical framework to provide anything but very generalized and rough analysis of the value of big free agent contracts because there are too many variables that inform value. I think if you’re going to evaluate those contracts, you have to look at them in the context of all those variables and properly analyze the whole issue. And that’s in part because I do think that $/WAR is only a useful tool as a general overview, and far less useful applied specifically as an isolated measure.

So our essential disagreement is that, as I understand, you think that $/WAR can be a starting point for measuring the relative value of specific contracts, and I think it can only be a useful measure for broad team based analysis and identifying outliers or patterns.

Now, as we’re talking about supply and demand, you’re moving it back to the market aggregate that generally maintains relative $/WAR values. Which is entirely correct. But the mobility in the market against the demand is a lot more complex and narrow than I think you’re allowing for. A team with an identified need and a narrow set of options to fill that need will not simply be able to make up the short fall by choosing two lesser upgrades because those are necessarily the factors in play. A team who needs, say, a number three starter, doesn’t look at the price of the available options and if they go to high, automatically moves to improve itself by adding a better left handed reliever and backup catcher. Scarcity drives value, and while the market generally corrects itself across the breadth of the game, that doesn’t mean that it is self correcting in every case.

Perhaps it’s because the market for FA is very finite. Missing out on one or two pitching options is often enough to see more money through at a clearly inferiour third because that need is still the most pressing for the team. I don’t think you can ignore the specific needs of each team against the specific options available each off season when determining value, and seeing how it fluctuates as availability starts to narrow. So paying a higher $/WAR rate for a player may not make sense as looked at as an isolated measure, but when taken as part of the larger context, may be seen as a positive or even desirable outcome.

by dexfarkin on Dec 30, 2011 11:04 PM EST up reply actions  

Thanks for the additional info, I enjoy informed back and forths like this. I agree on the nature of our essential disagreement, so that’s good. And we’re both pretty entrenched there, so it’s a matter of agreeing to disagree, which is fine.

The other thing then is this, as you very nicely phrased it:

[T]he mobility in the market against the demand is a lot more complex and narrow than I think you’re allowing for.
And that could well be. I agree with a lot of the general propositions you advanced, in terms of scarcity driving value, the market not self-correcting in every instance, and the options being finite. But I think you overemphasize the “specific /clear needs” element.

Let’s just pick up on the #3 starter example, and a team that could really use one as a clear upgrade. In the end, baseball is about scoring more runs than the other team, and it doesn’t really matter if they average 6 runs.game and give up 5.5, or score 5.0 and give up 4.5. So even if the “identified need” is for a #3 starter, this is usually just because it’s seen as the easiest way to improve the run differential. Let’s say the #3 could save 25 runs over the guy he displaces. The team is not limited to just saving 25 runs there, they could try to upgrade over the #5 guy, and add 15 runs on offense, the net effect is the same. And of course, they’re not limited to the free agent market in the current year either, there’s an intertemporal dimension in that they can trade prospects (future value) for current production.

Now, all that said, I don’t preclude that sometimes a team might “overpay” in terms of $/WAR and it’s still the best option, and it could make sense. But I don’t think that it’s pervasive enough that if you use the average $/WAR across a number of contracts, that it would nullify the results (which kinda brings us back to the original disagreement). Maybe it is the case for premium free agents, since they are truly scarce and less substitutible, at least for big market teams. But even then, even these teams generally have multiple weak spots, where a couple of smaller upgrades could make the same effect, such that the general equilbrium should generally prevail. And I think there’s also the possibility that there’s a middle ground, in that the truth may lie somewhat in the middle – I’m overestimating the substitutive possibilities, and you’re underestimating it.

I get the sense you have at least some background in economics, so I’m going to finish with a possible parallel that struck me while thinking about this. A source of the divide between Keynesian and non-Keynesian economics is regarding the “stickiness” of price levels, and the effects they have on the market’s ability to adjust and clear. In a sense, this disagreement is the same – to what degree does the substitutability of baseball players allow the market to reach an equilbrium or not. And goodness knows, the freshwater/saltwater divide hasn’t been settled!

by MjwW on Dec 31, 2011 12:33 AM EST up reply actions  

But I don’t think that it’s pervasive enough that if you use the average $/WAR across a number of contracts, that it would nullify the results

See, where on the same page in as I said it can be used as a rough thumbnail of a team’s position. Equalized out over multiple years and multiple contracts, you probably will have things trending towards the market norm. However, I don’t think you can then apply that to individual contracts as a benchmark to assess value, because the stressors that drive the market value on an individual level are different than the stressors that drive the market as a whole. That’s why I don’t like it as a starting point for individual contracts. It’s like assessing a single stock by comparing it to the patterns of the overall NYSE.

As for the smaller upgrades, again, in theory that is correct. But I don’t feel that it works as easily or has as many options to allow teams to avoid potentially overpaying by grabbing value elsewhere. Certainly, there’s other factors that can be used to fulfil needs when the market is overblown in one area or another, but each element of a roster that provides value is a seperate market, and on each team, there’s different dynamics in play. If the core area you need to upgrade in is starting pitcher and the market is like this off season, you are going to overpay in either monetary terms or in trade value because as a commodity, there’s a scarcity of talent available and it’s been priced at a premium. And maybe in 2014, a glut of arms come on the market and helps return it back to the average $/WAR when it is undervalued. But if that’s your core need for 2012, it is very difficult to say that you can easily turn around and upgrade other areas to balance out the weakness in another at a lesser cost. Usually, the cost of upgrading an already strong position to a stronger one is going to be more because you start to get into the area of those premium ‘superstars’. And in five minutes, someone will suggest trading for Votto…

I get the sense you have at least some background in economics

Not even close. Journalism. However, I read a lot, I’ve covered a lot of politics, and I’ve been following baseball offseasons closely for about two decades. You pick up a lot.

by dexfarkin on Dec 31, 2011 12:57 PM EST up reply actions  

agreed that only certain teams are probably able to take on such a large monetary outlay

even if it ends up providing excellent ROI, and I mentioned as much in the ARod section of the post. However, if a team is going to sign such a player, they are going to have to pay this much since if they don’t, someone else will. So it’s worthwhile looking at whether these outlays provide decent value or not.

by SuckaMD on Dec 30, 2011 1:11 PM EST up reply actions  

I agree

I should note, first, that right now there’s no good research on this, so really there’s not much else you can do but to use the linear $/WAR that is observed.

But intuitively, I’ve never thought linear $/WAR was right, because premium players are more productive and so should command more $/WAR. Then I understood why it’s balanced off – injury risk, salary concentration risk. But it seems as though these effects should be understood seperately, and analyzed seperately. We’re not there, but I hope soon we will be.

I think about it from an insurance point of view. Let’s say a mid-market team signs a player to a massive contract (think San Fran and Zito). They need to insurance themselves against the injury risk (or at least partially, they might assume some risk themsevles), and that insurance contract probably adds tens of millions of the contracts. If a large market team signs 3 or 4 of these guys (think the Yankees and Arod, CC, Texeiria, Jeter), they can count a little more on averages – one guy gets hurt, another doesn;t, and it cancels off. So rather than having tens of millions in insurance on each guy and contract, they may take out a little bit, but there’s a potential huge saving there that doesn’t get picked up purely in the baseball analysis. And say $10-15M over the life of an 7-8 year contract could make a huge difference in how good the contract looks.

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 2:00 PM EST up reply actions   1 recs

Really good read

Jose Bautista has a higher midi-chlorian count than you do.

by Jays11 on Dec 30, 2011 12:13 PM EST reply actions  

good, darren oliver is a really good signing

by bluebird24 on Dec 30, 2011 2:31 PM EST reply actions  

one thing that has to also be taken into consideration going forward

As much as I really appreciate your write up, if someone was to use the info as a basis for predicting future value/performance, they would have to factor in the fact that with steroid testing the numbers of these high priced players are more likely to drop of after they hit 33/4 yrs old than they have in the past. Rodriguez opted out before he hit that age and there is no way he’ll provide good value under his new contract. Ramirez played well into his late 30s but he was on the juice. Soriano and Lee started to have problems when they hit that age and had to pass drug tests.

I personally believe, anyone is free to disagree, that Texeira and Holliday will probably be earning half their pay at the tail end of their contracts (last 2-3 years). Same goes for Pujols

I think it’s no coincidence that once the league started testing all of a sudden the 35-40something players lost their ability to catch up to a fastball (Sheffield, Bonds, Dye) and all of a sudden we see a lot fewer older hitters being able to hold on to everyday jobs (ie: Vladi Guerrero seems ready to fall off a cliff )

So in other words, the analysis is great, but I think it has to be taken with a grain of skepticism if one were to try to apply it as a forecasting tool

by aaforpm on Dec 30, 2011 2:51 PM EST reply actions  

this is subjective

we don’t know the production effects steroids will have on players. it might make late-30s guys worse, and it might not.

by benk on Dec 30, 2011 3:33 PM EST up reply actions  

you think baseball is clean now?

I’m undecided, I’ve read various articles over the last few years that all basically agree that a player would have to be a complete idiot to get caught with the masking agents that are available, read another article about designer steroids that are flushed out of your system in a couple of days..speculation was pitchers could use them to recover between starts..I doubt it ever goes away.

by ABsteve on Dec 30, 2011 5:39 PM EST up reply actions  

I'm similarly cynical

The incentive structure is such that. if they actually help with baseball, such as helping recover more quickly, the payoff is huge to taking them and even getting slightly better. Which means that the masking agents, etc will always be ahead of regulators

by MjwW on Dec 30, 2011 7:00 PM EST up reply actions  

So, what you're saying is...

sign Prince Fielder because it will be worth it

by eight_legged_freaks on Dec 31, 2011 11:49 AM EST reply actions  

sarcasm noted

but if anything, this seems to indicate it’s far from as horrible a decision as popular opinion seems to indicate

by benk on Dec 31, 2011 12:28 PM EST up reply actions  

That’s liking saying “Oh I have a 40% chance of death, but 60% is bigger!”

Crippling contracts affect a MLB team big time. 25% of nearly 1.2 billion dollars is like 300M. The 8 contracts in this study combine for 1.2 billion dollars. 300M/1200M wasted. Average contract was 145.8M.

You might consider 75% favorable odds but I call it a gamble. I don’t see the value in rolling the dice this year when Lawrie is going into his 2nd year, but if we can sign Fielder we should (for a reasonable amount).

by Mike Andrew on Dec 31, 2011 4:09 PM EST up reply actions  

For what it's worth

I would go out and sign Fielder if I was AA.

Because, at the end of the day, to have one player produce over 6 WAR versus six guys who produce 1 WAR is always the better option. And even if Fielder’s body does break down (which I have no doubt it will), the value will be frontloaded, and Fielder playing as DH is still better than having a lower WAR player in that slot.

I dunno. I’m in the “for free agency” camp but I can also see why many people aren’t. All I know is there is no such thing as a 100% risk free guarantee.

by eight_legged_freaks on Dec 31, 2011 4:16 PM EST up reply actions  

Fielder is around a 4 WAR player if you play him at 1B

Front loading a contract cost a lot more money due to inflation or lack of it.

I’m down for FA next season, I’m not too crazy about anybody left on the market (I like Edwin Jackson for 1 year/15M) but if we can sign Prince I definitely would.

by Mike Andrew on Dec 31, 2011 4:30 PM EST up reply actions  

Not quite sure I understand your math. 2 of these were massive flops, and but the others according to the author provided decent value. But eve the massive flops provided some value – ie, their entire salaries weren’t write-offs.

Not I happen to disagree with the interpretation the author reached…I’ve been examining the numbers and have a different spin, and i hope to share my results soon (possibly later today) once I finish my analysis

by MjwW on Dec 31, 2011 4:24 PM EST up reply actions  

I understand your thinking

as with many arguments we’ve had this offseason, this one comes down to risk aversion (you seem to be more risk averse in this case than people like me, benk, and others) and where you see the Jays falling in their competition window (you seem to feel that the window is still a few years off). Both of these opinions are fair, in my view, and reasonable people can disagree about them.

My one quibble/question with you is why you are so focussed on Lawrie’s development. Obviously he had a great start and we hope he can continue be a top performer for the Jays for years to come. But lots of guys have had huge MLB debuts only to fall back to the pack – he’s certainly not a sure thing yet at this point. I’m not sure how you square your aversion to taking a risk now with Fielder with your certainty that we can wait to compete in the future because Lawrie will continue to be a megastar.

We already have that megastar in Bautista. His elite years aren’t going to last forever. I must say I’m not sure why you argue that the next competition window has to be built around Lawrie as the centrepiece. If we try to go for it soon, we have Bautista and Lawrie plus whatever other players are brought in as complements.

by SuckaMD on Jan 1, 2012 11:33 AM EST up reply actions  

I'm Lawries greatest critic

I’m pretty sure I almost got bannerhammered in his first game when I brought to light he cost us 3 outs on defense.

I still think the ages don’t line up. We are signing 28 year old Fielder to go with our much younger team. I would wait until we know if Colby is going to bounce back or if Kelly is going to bounce back.

Lawrie hopefully will get around .250/.350/.450 next season.

by Mike Andrew on Jan 1, 2012 1:15 PM EST up reply actions  

But isn't that a really waiting game to play?

What if Rasmus and Johnson both suck almost all year next year, and then have strong finishes to the season?

Then do we say, “Well, they’re clearly getting better, so we should wait and see if they can continue.”

At some point, teams just have to go for it. It’s also not like the Blue Jays are as financially cash strapped as the Rays where they literally have to gamble every single year on the most inane signings.

If Fielder works out for 4-5 years of the 10, and provides 4 years of playoffs, doesn’t that make it worth it?

This is my main quibble with the new statistical minded approach to baseball analysis. While I acknowledge it’s absolutely, one hundred percent, made the game better, I feel like it has made fanbases so leery of any big move, that there’s no excitement anymore. You can run all the projections in the world and take the most calculated risk ever, but it’s still a risk.

And if that risk sucks in the last five years of his 10 year deal, but is absolutely dynamite in the first five years, and one of those seasons results in a World Series, isn’t it worth it?

Sustained success is a nice idea. But if you’re at the precipice of being a competitor, how long do you have to wait to finally pull the trigger?

by eight_legged_freaks on Jan 1, 2012 2:15 PM EST up reply actions   1 recs

Interesting points

And I think at some point, there will be a time to pull the trigger…just I just don’t think it makes sense to do so. The farm needs another year to pump out major league players…and another development year for the talent at the really low levels. In my opinion at least

by MjwW on Jan 1, 2012 2:37 PM EST up reply actions  

Yeah, it seems to be the single most polarizing opinion on this blog

Personally I’m in a win-now mode and it stems from impatience. But I also see the argument for the farm system.

I think for me it stems from the fact that I don’t trust the idea of developing prospects nearly as much as everyone here because of the three prospects that I believed in when I was just starting to get into baseball: Eric Hinske, Josh Towers and Cameron Maybin.

All considered to be great prospects, all major busts (Hinske is a good utility player).

That’s why, for me, I would rather pay a free agent to come in and provide immediate value, rather than wait for five years and come out with a really good bench player.

Again, I am in no way saying prospects aren’t the way to go, because they clearly are. I’m just so jaded because of buying all-in on those three guys that I look at prospects as guys who will fail, with only one or two being successful.

Which is not a good way to look at it at all haha

by eight_legged_freaks on Jan 1, 2012 2:47 PM EST up reply actions  

Yep I understand the frustration

As a 15-year Jays fan, who missed the glory years…the high point was 1998, being kinda in the WC hunt in early Sept, which was my first full season following them.

That said, the past is the past, and cannot be changed. Letting if affect future plans is a big mistake. For me personally, I think it’s easier, as I’m used to identifying sunk costs and thinking about them as such. But it’s not easy to do, and usually requires some formal training.

by MjwW on Jan 1, 2012 3:28 PM EST up reply actions  

You have to look at the prospects as a whole

Not just select a few. Prospects like Noah and Deck may seem great but you can’t count on either of them to individually make it, due to the massive bust rate. You figure we have like 15-20 B- or higher level prospects and of those maybe 2-3 become successful MLB starters and another 2-3 maybe become successful MLB backups.

I’m a firm believer that we have at least 1 gem in our minor league system (excluding Lawrie) and we just have to wait to find out who it is. That’s why I don’t like the idea of trading away prospects for MLBers just yet.

I think at least 1 more year, maybe 2 is needed before we look at contending. Until then just stopgaps in the bullpen etc. should be good.

by Mike Andrew on Jan 1, 2012 3:33 PM EST up reply actions  

If it's two years though

They should just trade Bautista because he will be way less valuable in two years than he is now and they could get a huuuuuge return, probably with near MLB ready guys.

Like, massive. So if the window for contention is two years from now, why hold onto an asset that will depreciate in value and receive some massive prospects?

by eight_legged_freaks on Jan 1, 2012 3:41 PM EST up reply actions  

Because there's value in winning now

First, you may get lucky, have a bunch of guys have career years, and “luck” into the playoffs anyway.

Second, it makes the gap from .500 to 90 wins smaller. It’s easier to add 5 wins than 10 wins.

by MjwW on Jan 1, 2012 3:45 PM EST up reply actions  

(and what I mean by that last part is the Jays are probably around an 85 win true talent team next year as is, and trading Bautista dumps them back to around 80)

by MjwW on Jan 1, 2012 3:46 PM EST up reply actions  

True

I don’t know if I read it somewhere here or elsewhere, but it basically said that being a .500 team is pretty easy, even winning 70-75 games is easy. It’s getting the next 10 or 15 wins needed to make the playoffs that is nearly impossible.

So I see what you’re saying.

by eight_legged_freaks on Jan 1, 2012 3:58 PM EST up reply actions  

I'm a firm believer in trading Bautista

But I see the logic and value in keeping him.

Our attendance is abysmal as it is, I don’t think trading him would help it any.

by Mike Andrew on Jan 1, 2012 3:52 PM EST up reply actions  

Comments For This Post Are Closed


User Tools

Welcome to the SB Nation blog about our heroic azure-tinged corvidae, the Toronto Blue Jays.

FanPosts

Community blog posts and discussion.

Recommended FanPosts

Hal2_small
Quantifying the Effect of Team Defense on Over/Underperforming the Team's FIP
Small
Brett Lawrie's historic defensive prowess

Recent FanPosts

Small
Blue Jays Player Stats Multiplied by 4
Small
Petition to change Suckage Award Titles
Jaysfanimage_small
The Lansing 4: What to do when they outpitch expectations?
Misc_003_small
Jays' All-Star Alliterative Name Team
Kingkelly_small
Stats tools?
Small
Jays Future Closer?
N41306733_31278203_7401_steve_golfin_small
my MLB power ranking, May Edition
Jaysfanimage_small
Blue Jays Farm Report - Apr 29-May 5

+ New FanPost All FanPosts >

Yahoo_full_count

Managers

Bluejayperched_small hugo

Rincewind-1_small Tom Dakers

Assistant Manager

Smith_up_small JohnnyG

Authors

Hiro_small jessef

Profile_small masterkembo

Profiel_small Woodman663

Minorleaguer_small Minor Leaguer

Tony_fernandez_small TonyFernandezSavedMyLife

Moderators

J_bau_small jays182

Aejfuulciaar18g_small Bowling_Guy25